

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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National Intelligence Council

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: 25X1
Acting National Intelligence Officer for
Western Europe

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe

1. Poland: Initial West European responses to the imposition of martial law were much stronger at the popular and trade-union levels than from governments. Most government reactions have continued to be cautious, more or less maintaining a distinction between implicit tolerance of "internal" measures and concern over "intervention." But the gap distinguishing official from popular expressions has begun to be filled from some quarters--most notably in strong statements by French President Mitterrand and PCI Chief Berlinguer, both of whom say repression in Poland has serious consequences for Europe regardless of the degree of Soviet involvement. The West Germans may be the most difficult to bring along on a hardened official European reaction to the Polish situation. 25X1

2. Greece-Spain-NATO: Ultimate ratification by Greece of Spain's bid for NATO membership cannot be assumed on the strength of Prime Minister Papandreou's reassurances. Whether or not ratification by the Greek parliament is required is moot, since Papandreou has the parliamentary strength to determine the outcome politically in any case. Papandreou's obstructionism at the Alliance ministerial sessions, even if not winning Greece substantive points, may be seen by him as effective "theatre" for the home front. And the demonstration effect of Greek obstreperousness could come into play again on the Spanish question during the ratification process. More likely are the possibilities for linkage with other issues, notably negotiations with the US on the DECA. We do not discount, however, Papandreou's sensitivity to being isolated within the Alliance on too many issues at the same time, and the Spanish question is of lesser importance to him than the complex of issues more directly related to Greek relations with Turkey. 25X1

3. Spain: The NATO question is not irrelevant for the future of relations between the Spanish government and military; Alliance resistance to

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Spain--presumably caused by a Greek veto--would be a severe embarrassment to the government and a further reason for military disillusionment. More immediately, the recent manifesto by captains and lower-ranking officers attacking the press for attempting to discredit the military is indicative of continuing unrest that goes beyond those directly involved. Analysts are concerned about the diminishing effectiveness of such checks on the military as the king and a tradition of military discipline. The government can do little to assuage the military's stated concerns and will have to move cautiously on how it approaches the trials of those implicated in the failed February coup. Any signs of renewed crisis within the governing UCD party, meanwhile, could serve to spur on activists within the military. ☐ 25X1

4. Portugal: Analysts take seriously the "climate of nervousness" in Portugal arising principally from maneuvering over pending constitutional revisions that would place the military under parliamentary control. One can expect a continuing tense situation between politicians and President Eanes, but it still seems likely that a typically Portuguese compromise will ultimately be reached--probably one that pays some respect to the military's traditional autonomy. Given the severe problems on the economic and labor relations front, the government may not wish to push too hard on the constitutional question. Military sensitivities will, in any case, be a factor weighing on the government in defense-related negotiations with the US; Lisbon has pressing political reasons for seeing that the military gets what it wants. ☐ 25X1

5. Belgium: The new center-right Belgian government will be better able than predecessors to frame a coherent economic policy, but the measures are likely to hit French-speaking Belgium hardest and thus exacerbate tensions between Flemings and Walloons. The perennial "national problem" is for the first time apparently being taken seriously by many Belgians as a threat to federal cohesion, but analysts believe that separatistic trends do not yet endanger the unity of the state. The new government under Prime Minister Martens may be marginally more helpful on INF, but is not likely materially to accelerate deployment. ☐ 25X1

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